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Abstract
In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is
more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to
give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model
of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium
corruption into two components: the ﬁrst one reﬂects variations in the quality of
institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data
suggest that both components of the correlation are signiﬁcant, however the eﬀect
of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt coun-
tries, since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.
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E-mail: david.delacroix@uclouvain.be, clara@ifmr.ac.inMore than ten years ago, international aid donors indicated their intention to base
aid allocation more and more on good governance, and in particular on ﬁghting against
corruption. Had these announces been translated into action, the measured correlation
between aid and corruption, ceteris paribus, should have become negative. However,
despite oﬃcial positions and pronouncements, Alesina and Weder (2002) show that more
corrupt governments receive more aid from developed countries. In this paper, we argue
that this ﬁnding can be in accordance with optimal behavior of donors.
Aid is allocated to countries with better institutions but also to countries with lower
productivity, i.e. to poorer countries. Thus we decompose the correlation between aid
and corruption into two components: an institutional one and a productivity one. An
improvement in the quality of institutions induces a lower level of corruption and a higher
level of aid reception. According to this eﬀect, the correlation between aid and corruption
should be negative. However this can be counterbalanced by what we call the productivity
eﬀect: lower levels of productivity are associated with higher levels of both corruption
and optimal aid, leading to a positive correlation between aid and corruption. Therefore,
if the heterogeneity in productivity is more important among developing countries than
the heterogeneity in the quality of institutions, the eﬀect of the productivity component
is prevalent. Indeed, since most corrupt countries are also the poorest it is optimal to
provide them with more aid. An illustration of this phenomenon is the case of Botswana
and Uganda: these two Sub-Saharan countries display higher levels of productivity and
“better institutions” than other countries in the region. They receive about the lowest
levels of foreign aid among Sub-saharan countries because in this region countries diﬀer
more by productivity levels than by governance quality.
We show that corrupt governments can receive more foreign aid in a very streamlined
framework. Section 1 proposes a coherent example where it can be optimal to give aid
to the most corrupt countries. In this model, households allocate their time among
three activities: private production, government production and diversion of government
production (corruption)1. At equilibrium the returns on the three occupations should
be equalized. Given this incentive constraint, a donor has to allocate scarce resources
to provide aid to a set of countries. In Section 2, we estimate the eﬀect of productivity
and institutions quality on foreign aid and the level of corruption in 159 aid-recipient
countries; we decompose the correlation between aid and corruption and show that it
is tilted towards being positive because the variance of productivity across countries is
high. Section 3 details the extent to which these ﬁndings are robust to the measurement
of the variables, to the estimation method, and to the inclusion of additional variables.
Section 4 concludes.
1Corruption is generally deﬁned by economists as the misuse of public oﬃce for private gain. In our
model, corruption is restricted to embezzlement.
11 The Model Economy
We consider a one-period model economy populated by a continuum of workers of unitary
mass. The government of this economy receives some general ﬁnancial assistance from
abroad. Workers choose to allocate their time among three activities: private production
lc, government production lg and diversion of government production lx.2 The time
resource constraint is
1 = lc + lg + lx. (1)
There are three goods in this economy: a consumption good produced by the private
sector (say rice), a government good (say education), and labor. The consumption good
is produced from labor; each unit of labor produces a > 1 units of good; lc is labor
input in this sector and a is a parameter reﬂecting exogenous productivity factors, such
as soil quality or technological level. Assuming that ﬁrms are operated by self-employed
workers, per-capita income is equal to average productivity a. In order to compute the
equilibrium explicitly we assume constant marginal productivity in the private sector,
however it is not crucial for the results.
The government levies lump sum taxes in order to ﬁnance government spending.
Each individual pays an amount t independently of the type of job she does. With this
assumption taxes do not distort the choice of activity by workers. Total consumption c
is given by: c = alc − t.
The government resources include taxes t and aid z. Both are used to produce the
government good g. The production function in the government sector is given by
 
lg,
where lg is labor input in this sector. A part lx/ν of the product is diverted from its
purpose, with lx representing the labor input devoted to corruption activities, and ν
a parameter measuring the quality of institutions. Given the time spent in corruption
activities lx, if institutions are of high quality, the share of government spending diverted
from its purpose is small (corruption is better controlled). The eﬀective production of




The budget constraint of the government can be rewritten as:
t     
taxes




lg     
total spending





      
diverted spending
. (2)
Income per worker in the government sector is equal to average productivity: g/lg. Bu-
reaucrats’ income is, like in Becker and Stigler (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Acemoglu
and Verdier (2000), an incentive payment increasing in the eﬀectiveness of government
2This reﬂects that civil servants may also own a small shop and/or embezzle public resources.
2spending. The per-capita income from corruption is:
 
lg/ν. At any interior equilibrium,








This relation, which describes the choice of activity by households, acts as a constraint for
the donor problem and makes the level of corruption endogenous. We label it the incentive
constraint. Notice that this relationship pegs the level of government employment lg.
Taxes adjust endogenously to balance the budget. Let us now provide a deﬁnition of an
equilibrium for a given economy and show that, if the quality of institutions is suﬃciently
poor relative to productivity, such an equilibrium with positive corruption exists.
Deﬁnition 1 Given foreign aid z, productivity a and institutional quality ν, an equilib-
rium with corruption is represented by a level of tax {t} and a vector of positive labor
inputs {lc,lg,lx} such that the budget of the government is balanced (Equation (2)), the
labor market clears (Equation (1)) and the incentive constraint holds (Equation (3)).
Proposition 1 If the quality of institutions satisﬁes ν < 1/a2 < 1, there exists a unique
equilibrium with corruption where t = aν − z, and




lx = ν(1 − a
2ν).
Alternatively, if institutions were good enough, i.e. ν ≥ 1/a2, the economy would be in a
corner regime with lx = 0. However in our analysis we are only interested in the interior
regime with a positive level of corruption.
Proposition 1 says that there is a unique number of government employees which is
compatible with labor market clearing and equality of remunerations across sectors. Any
other level of public employment would violate at least one of these conditions and would
not be an equilibrium outcome. Finally, in equilibrium, consumption of both goods is
given by:
c =alc − t = a + z − 2aν (4)
g =
 
lg(1 − νlx) = a
3ν
2. (5)
We measure the corruption level x by the implicit “tax” rate on the production of the
government good:
x = lx/ν = 1 − a
2ν. (6)
3Proposition 2 Equilibrium corruption x is decreasing in productivity a and decreasing
in the quality of institutions ν.
Higher productivity a makes private activity more rewarded, decreasing the amount
of time spent on corruption activities. This makes government spending more productive
(the increase in productivity spreads over the public sector via the incentive constraint)
and it raises the labor input in the government sector. Better institutions ν make cor-
ruption less proﬁtable and increase the productivity of the government sector.
Let us now consider the problem of the donor agency, who has to allocate aid across






zi = ¯ z,
where ¯ z is the total amount of aid available and ui(zi) is the utility of country i associated
to aid zi.3 It is optimal to equalize the marginal utility of aid across countries.4 We assume
that the utility function of each country is logarithmic and separable in ci and gi:
ui = ln(ci) + γ ln(gi)
where ci and gi are given by (4) and (5) and where γ represents the relative weight of the











ai + zi − 2aiνi
Optimal aid is obtained by equalizing this marginal utility across countries u′
i = u′
j = ¯ u,
∀i,j ∈ I, where ¯ u is the marginal utility which can be achieved given the resource




+ ai(2νi − 1) (7)
Proposition 3 Optimal aid z is a positive function of the quality of institutions ν. More-
over for νi < 1/2 optimal aid is a negative function of productivity ai.
The ﬁrst statement of the proposition is in line with the new poverty reduction strate-
gies, in which governance quality is a key conditionality. When institutions are of high
quality, public spending and taxes are relatively more important than private consump-
tion. Marginal utility of consumption is high and aid eﬀective in raising utility. Good
3Alternatively we can have a formulation where the donor maximizes
 
(u(zi) − ρzi) where ρ is the
cost of funds. This would lead to exactly the same results.
4In section 3, we show that our main results remain unchanged when substituting a ”donor interests”
model for this ”recipient needs” model.
4governments are helped by reducing the need for taxation in their country. The second
statement gives a condition under which aid is allocated in priority to poor countries.5
In this case, when productivity a is high, both productivity in the private sector and
consumption are high, reducing the need for aid. The role of the condition νi < 1/2
becomes clear when considering the equilibrium consumption given in Equation (4). The
eﬀect of productivity a on equilibrium consumption c is a priori ambiguous (hence the
ambiguity on aid). Productivity has a direct “one to one” eﬀect on consumption via the
production of physical good. But it also has an indirect eﬀect through the government
budget constraint: more productivity also implies more taxes and less consumption. This
indirect eﬀect dominates the direct one if ν < 1/2.
2 Empirical Strategy and Results
Consider now a set of countries I. Each country is characterized by productivity ai > 1
and institution quality νi < 1/2, with i ∈ I. In each country, the level of corruption is xi
satisfying equation (6) and aid is zi satisfying equation (7). Taking a ﬁrst order Taylor
Expansion of equations (6) and (7) around the equilibrium, we obtain:
dxi = −β11dai − β12dνi (8)
dzi = −β21dai + β22dνi (9)
where dx represents the diﬀerence between variable x and its mean (taken over set I).
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with s = 1/(σdxiσdzi). The ﬁrst term,
T1 = sβ12β22var(dνi),
shows that when countries diﬀer by institutions quality, more aid will be given to countries
with better institutions, which are also characterized by lower corruption. Hence the
correlation between aid and corruption is negative. The second term,
T2 = sβ11β21var(dai) + s(β12β21 − β11β22)cov(dai,dνi),
5Notice that the condition νi < 1/2 is more restrictive than the one in Proposition 1 only if ai <
√
2.
5arises because productivity varies between countries. If productivity varies enough, it
could counterbalance T1 and reverse the sign of the correlation between aid and cor-
ruption. T2 is the sum of two terms: β11β21var(dai) is positive and reﬂects that more
aid tend to be given to poor countries, which are also characterized by higher levels of
corruption. (β12β21 − β11β22)cov(dai,dνi) has an ambiguous eﬀect: it reﬂects the fact
that productivity and quality of institutions are likely to be positively correlated. Hence,
if developing countries diﬀer mostly by productivity levels (high var(dai)), more than
by governance quality (var(dνi)), aid and level of corruption may well turn out to be
positively correlated.
Notice that in the above decomposition we have neglected error terms which will be
introduced in equations (8)-(9) when doing the estimations. These errors add additional
components to the correlation between aid and corruption, which may or may not be
negligible, given the highly stylized nature of our exercise.
We turn now to the estimation of equations (8)-(9), which will allow us to decompose
the correlation between aid and corruption in the two terms detailed above.
We focus on 159 recipient countries over the period 1996-2005. Over this period, win-
ning the Cold War is no longer a motive to provide aid to developing countries (Meernik,
Krueger, and Poe 1998); on the contrary, it is during this period that aid started to be
conditioned on improving governance in recipient countries (Tornell and Lane (1999),
(Burnside and Dollar 2000)).
We ﬁrst run a benchmark estimation of seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE). Aid is
measured in real dollars per capita (from World Development Indicators, as in Alesina and
Weder (2002)), it includes both multilateral and bilateral ﬂows. As a proxy for the level
of corruption x we use the “Control of Corruption” index provided by the World Bank
and presented by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). This index is an aggregate of
the results of several surveys including questions such as “How many government oﬃcials
do you think are involved in corruption?”. Contrary to Transparency International’s
corruption perceptions index, the World Bank one makes possible intertemporal, as well as
cross-country, comparisons. Moreover this index has the advantage of measuring mainly
public corruption, although it has the drawback to be based on perception surveys.6
The quality of institutions is measured by the Political stability index available in the
Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS). Productivity is measured by
the level of GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables.7
6Other indices used to measure public corruption (e.g. from Business International (Ehrlich and Lui
1999) or Political Risk Services (Mauro 1997)) have the same disadvantages. But the World Bank index
reduces each source-speciﬁc bias by combining them.
7Productivity is not corrected to deduce the eﬀect of natural resources (see Hall and Jones (1999)).
We do not want this correction here because natural resources are part of the country income and should
be kept in a.
6Table 1: Estimation Results - benchmark
Obs. Parameters Correlation
Estimates Decomposition
β11 β12 β21 β22
corr
(dxi,dzi) T1 T2
939 0.273 0.384 0.718 0.633 0.085 -0.200 0.443
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: P-values in brackets. All countries have equal weights.
Table 1 presents the results. All the β coeﬃcients have the expected sign and they
are all signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. We use them to decompose the correlation between aid
and corruption. We compute the standard error of the terms T1 and T2 using the delta
method (Oehlert 1992), considering that the variances and covariances of the variables are
known.8 We conclude that aid is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the level of
corruption: T2, the positive correlation due to diﬀerences in productivity levels between
recipient countries, is stronger than T1, the negative correlation due to diﬀerences in
governance quality.9
3 Robustness Analysis
In this section we analyze the extent to which the ﬁndings of the previous section are
robust to the measurement of the variables, to the estimation method and to the inclusion
of additional variables. In general we ﬁnd that the size of coeﬃcients and correlations
can change substantially but their sign and signiﬁcance remains unaltered by alternative
speciﬁcations.
3.1 Alternative Measures and Sample
We consider alternative measures for institutions quality, aid and productivity. In Table 2,
the ﬁrst block reports the estimation results where the variable Regulatory quality is
replaced by (a) Rule of Law, (b) Government eﬀectiveness, (c) Political stability, and
(d) Voice and accountability, respectively. Lines (i) and (ii) refer to speciﬁcations using
total aid excluding debt relief and only multilateral aid. Line (I) reports the estimation
results where the variable GDP per capita is replaced by GDP per worker. Finally, in
the benchmark model we have pooled all the data available. However, there is little
8Notice that we do not report the residual component of the correlation since it is a combination of
diﬀerences in productivity levels and diﬀerences in institutional qualities, which makes its interpretation
vague. In most regressions, this residual component is not signiﬁcant.
9If, in Rwanda, the quality of institutions and the level of productivity improved and were comparable
to Honduras (the level of GDP per capita would double, from 1150 to 2300), the level of corruption would
decrease but the level of total aid received as well (from 55 to 48 million dollars).
7variation in the variables over time, so it might be that the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients
is artiﬁcially inﬂated by a large number of similar observations. To address this issue, we
run the regression for each year separately. The last block of Table 2 reports the results
for years 1996 and 2004.
When using diﬀerent measures of institutional quality, all coeﬃcients have the ex-
pected sign and they are all signiﬁcant at the 1%-level except when we measure the
quality of institutions by the rule of law. In that case, rule of law and corruption are
highly correlated and productivity has a smaller eﬀect on corruption. This would plead
for using instrumental variables methods in order to correct for the possible simultaneity
bias in the coeﬃcients. Then, when measuring productivity by GDP per worker instead
of GDP per capita (line I), the estimation is very close to the benchmark. For all years, all
coeﬃcients have the same sign as in the benchmark and are signiﬁcant. The correlation
between corruption and aid as in Alesina and Weder (2002) is not signiﬁcant. But we
provide here a rational explanation for the absence of correlation: both the institutions
part and the productivity part of the correlation decomposition, T1 and T2 respectively,
are signiﬁcant. Hence, the positive eﬀect of diﬀerences in productivity on the correlation
between aid and corruption compensates the negative eﬀect of the gap in the quality of
institutions.
Indeed, our results are robust to the restriction of the sample to speciﬁc years in the
period 1996-2005. They are also robust to the inclusion of time dummies in the pooled
estimation (they are not signiﬁcant) and to the exclusion of countries with extremely high
levels of aid per capita, because of their very small size, such as Micronesia, Marshall
Islands, Tonga or Kiribati.
3.2 Instrumentation
Next, we estimate the two equations with an instrumented three-stage least squares
method to account for possible endogeneity biases aﬀecting the four coeﬃcients estimates
(Table 3). We use four standard instrumental variables correlated either with productivity
or with the quality of institutions (see Burnside and Dollar (2000)): the 20-year lagged
log of GDP per capita (or per worker), the 5-year lagged log of trade openness (sum of
exports and imports as a percent of GDP), the 20-year lagged illiteracy rate and the log
of the number of years after independence.
The results of instrumented estimations are presented in Table 3. On the whole,
sign and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients and correlations do not change. However, the size
of β21 and β22 is higher compared to the benchmark.10 As a consequence, both partial
10The omission of a war component for example in the regression of aid may lead to a negative bias in
the estimation of the marginal eﬀects of both productivity and institutional quality on the level of aid
received: a war dummy may be negatively correlated with both productivity and institutional quality
but positively with the level of aid. Instrumenting enables to reduce this negative bias.
8correlations are increased too.
To test the relevance of the instruments, we look at the Fisher-statistics correspond-
ing to the ﬁrst stage of the instrumentation regression of productivity and quality of
institutions. We also run a Sargan overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that in-
strumental variables are not correlated with the error terms of the equation of interest.
The results of these tests are reported in the right columns of Table 3 in Appendix. The
high values of the F-statistics, all except two superior to 10, indicate that the instruments
are not weak: the coeﬃcients are well identiﬁed and the inference is robust (Staiger and
Stock 1997). Whether our instruments are correlated with the error terms or not is less
clear cut. The results of the Sargan test suggest that they are not as far as the ﬁrst
three measures of ν are instrumented (political stability, rule of law, and government
eﬀectiveness).11
3.3 Missing Variables
The equations estimated above were deliberately simple, and included only two variables:
productivity and institutions. These two should be of ﬁrst-order importance as far as aid
and corruption are concerned, as indicated by our theoretical model. In this subsection
we generalize our approach assuming that the donor puts weights θi on the countries i,
in accordance with its political agenda. These weights may for example represent closer
tights, due to a colonial past, political or strategic alliances (Alesina and Dollar 2000).12






zi = ¯ z.
Optimal aid is obtained by equalizing this marginal utility across countries θiu′
i = θju′
j =
¯ u, ∀i,j ∈ I. ¯ u is the weighted marginal utility which can be achieved given the resource




+ ai(2νi − 1).
and is positively related to the weight given to the country.
So as to take into account the donors’ political agenda, we include variables identical
to those used in Alesina and Weder (2002) and Alesina and Dollar (2000): two dummies
11The instruments are less relevant when measuring the quality of institutions by voice and account-
ability or regulatory quality.
12Diﬀerent weights given to countries may also result from socio-political instability (Chauvet 2003).
But this is captured in our benchmark estimation.
9with value 1 respectively if the recipient country is Israel and Egypt because of their
geostrategic position, FrdJapan and FrdUSA which give the percentage of times in
which the recipient has voted in the UN as Japan or as the USA.13 The β-coeﬃcients
are not aﬀected by the introduction of these control dummies, assessing the robustness
of the previous estimations: the level of aid is aﬀected by donors’ strategic interests but
this eﬀect does not overcome the ‘selectivity’ eﬀect according to which more aid is given
to poorer countries with better institutions.
4 Conclusion
Despite the oﬃcial claim of multilateral organizations to be conditioning foreign aid
on institutional reforms of the recipient country, aid is not negatively correlated with
corruption across countries. This correlation is, if anything, positive. In this note we
provide a rationale for this fact, which can a priori be viewed as irrational.
The rationality for giving more aid to more corrupt countries arises because corruption
is itself endogenous, and negatively related to productivity. Since it is optimal for donors
to give more aid to countries with low productivity, it turns out that aid and corruption
are positively correlated at equilibrium, at least as long as productivity is the main source
of diﬀerences across countries.
We have evaluated this prediction by estimating the eﬀect of productivity and quality
of institutions on both corruption and foreign aid. The positive correlation between aid
and corruption due to diﬀerences in productivity levels is signiﬁcant and stronger than the
negative correlation arising from diﬀerences in governance quality. This result is highly
robust to changes in time period, in the way institution quality is measured and in the
use of alternate model speciﬁcations.
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11A Tables for the Robustness Analysis
Table 2: Robustness analysis - variable deﬁnitions and samples
Obs. β11 β12 β21 β22
corr
(dxi,dzi) T1 T2
(a) 986 0.026 0.834 0.666 0.493 0.085 -0.228 0.314
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
(b) 986 0.055 0.809 0.564 0.307 0.085 -0.134 0.273
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
(c) 986 0.344 0.312 0.671 0.731 0.085 -0.167 0.412
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
(d) 986 0.199 0.508 0.575 0.323 0.085 -0.113 0.305
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
(i) 790 0.260 0.369 0.536 0.694 -0.085 -0.245 0.325
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
(ii) 791 0.229 0.383 0.769 0.795 0.00 -0.268 0.376
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(I) 901 0.245 0.401 0.573 0.419 0.100 -0.142 0.334
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1996 116 0.305 0.303 0.491 0.406 0.024 -0.106 0.307
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.02) (0.00)
2004 150 0.275 0.423 0.767 0.729 0.056 -0.233 0.468
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Alternative measures of ν: (a) Rule of Law, (b) Government eﬀectiveness,
(c) Voice and accountability, (d) Regulatory. Alternative measures of aid: (i) Total aid
excluding debt relief, (ii) Multilateral aid only. Alternative measure of productivity:
(I) GDP per worker. quality. P-values in brackets. All countries have equal weights.
12Table 3: Robustness analysis - - Instrumentation
Obs. β11 β12 β21 β22 corr T1 T2 Sargan stat. F-stat.
(dxi,dzi) Eq.(8) Eq.(9) (dep. var: a) (dep. var: ν)
bench. 607 0.342 0.317 1.123 1.454 0.165 -0.339 0.756 5.720 1.689 1226.12 81.31
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00)
(a) 615 0.137 0.666 1.822 2.576 0.169 -0.913 1.095 6.037 2.396 1291.37 148.76
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00)
(b) 615 0.113 0.762 2.074 3.284 0.169 -1.336 1.275 20.771 2.730 1291.37 115.39
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
(c) 615 0.479 0.025 0.596 0.268 0.169 0.004 0.344 27.224 72.103 1291.37 53.96
(0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(d) 615 0.305 0.383 1.373 1.944 0.169 -0.410 0.969 28.305 20.040 1291.37 93.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(i) 553 0.355 0.217 0.847 1.551 0.00 -0.296 0.615 11.371 20.227 874.13 53.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(ii) 552 0.312 0.257 1.214 1.493 0.13 -0.321 0.676 8.575 40.163 841.20 54.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(I) 602 0.305 0.362 0.947 1.220 0.157 -0.327 0.619 3.451 3.440 1296.40 79.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
1996 77 0.233 0.703 0.855 1.710 0.001 -0.695 0.521 1.529 0.535 138.33 6.72
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.47) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00)
2004 92 0.395 0.255 0.899 1.189 0.119 -0.204 0.620 2.083 3.380 164.87 11.70
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.09) (0.00) (0.35) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Alternative measures of ν: (a) Rule of Law, (b) Government eﬀectiveness, (c) Voice and accountability, (d) Regulatory
quality. Alternative measures of aid: (i) Total aid excluding debt relief, (ii) Multilateral aid only. Alternative measure of
productivity: (I) GDP per worker. P-values in brackets. All countries have equal weights.
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